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SOME COMMENTS ON THE RELATION OF
PRE-TRIAL TO THE RULES OF EVIDENCE
HARRY D. NIMS*

The term "Pre-Trial" is of such recent origin that it is found in few, if
any, dictionaries. It seems to be used to describe conferences or hearings
attended by counsel for litigants (and by litigants themselves, if they so
desire) and a judge of the court to discuss the simplification of the issues to
be tried, the sufficiency of the pleadings, the possibility of obtaining admissions and stipulations of facts and documents to avoid unnecessary proof,
the limiting of the number of expert witnesses, and any other measures
which may aid in the disposition of the case when it comes to trial.
In some jurisdiction, civil cases are called into conferences with a judge
with the express and understood purpose of considering their disposition
without regard for rules of evidence. Such conferences represent a method
of ending lawsuits by negotiation rather than by trial, and they seem to
coincide with public policy. The public and most plaintiffs, particularly in
tort litigation, approve them because any layman can understand their purpose
and the methods used in them.

In 1947 Judge Harry M. Fisher, of the Circuit Court of Cook County,
Illinois, of wide experience with pre-trial, in a letter to the writer, made a
statement that can hardly be repeated too often. It is this:
"Since every lawsuit ultimately comes to an end, why not help the parties to reach
that end by amiable businesslike arrangements? Settled the case will be, if not by
agreement, then by imposition through judicial pronunciamento, leaving one and not
infrequently both of the parties dissatisfied, disgruntled and with respect for judicial
process considerably shaken."
The spirit of the pre-trial conference and the spirit of a trial in which
the rules of evidence are used bear little resemblance.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, through judge Huxman, once said:
"The spirit of a pre-trial procedure is not only to call the parties together and
ask them to stipulate as to all matters concerning which there can be no dispute, but
to compel them to stipulate and agree as to all facts concerning which there can be no
real issue. The court has a right to compel the parties to do this. . . . Unless the court
has such power, the pre-trial conference is indeed innocuous and of little help. Without
Rule 16, the court always had the power to ask the parties to meet and request them
to try to get together on all such matter."'
*Member, Nims, Verdi & Martin, New York City; author, PRE-TRAL (1950),
UNFAIR COalPETIONS AND TRADE MARKS (4th ed. 1947).

1. Berger v. Brannan, 172 F.2d 241, 243 (10th Cir. 1949).
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Rules similar to Federal Rule 16 exist in some 29 states.
The impact of pre-trial procedure on rules of evidence is illustrated by
a report adopted by the Judicial Conference of the United States on September 26, 1951.2 Judge E. Barrett Prettyman is the chairman of the committee preparing the report. It recommends various methods of simplifying
the presentation of evidence, without full compliance with the rulse of evidence.
For instance, it suggests, in the interet of economy of time and lessening of
expense, that before the trial begins, counsel submit evidence to each other
and supply each other with copies of documents proposed to be used as
exhibits; that they confer and decide upon what is irrelevant material and
eliminate it; that the court require succinct narrative summaries of depositions and that each party indicate any inaccuracies in it. The report refers
to a deposition of 3000 pages which was condensed into 120 pages.
judge Henry E. Ackerson, Jr., of the New Jersey Superior Court points
out that, in the New Jersey courts, when counsel receive notice of a pretrial conference, they are advised to consult with each other in advance of
the conference to agree on as many of the items which will come up there
for discussion as they possibly can.3 In this way in the pre-trial conference,
the attention of the court can be focussed on the matters in which its aid is
needed in reaching a satisfactory pre-trial order.
In 1945, Justice Linn of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania said that:
"While the rules for pre-trial conference provide a method of simplifying issues,
and controlling trial procedure, there is nothing to indicate that they were intended
to displace the bill of discovery; they do not provide for the compulsory disclosure
of evidence by the opposing party under oath-one of the essentials of discovery."'
The decisions are not clear as to the powers of the courts to insist that
the facts of a case be disclosed in a pre-trial conference.
Judge Tuttle of the Eastern District Court for Michigan in Meikle v.
Timken-Detroit Axle Co.,5 once wrote that ".. . even with recalcitrant counsel,
the rules of civil procedure give the courts ample power to call for a pretrial hearing under Rule 16, and to force an explanation of the issues. ..."
Judge McColloch of the District Court of Oregon has held that in making
an order for a new trial, the court has power to direct the court reporter to
certify to testimony of a witness in the first trial to be read at the second
2. PRoc:muRE IN ANTI-TRusT AND OTHER PROTRACTED CASES (1951) (distributed
by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts).
3. Ackerson, PretrialConferences and CalendarControl: The Keys to Effective Work
i the Trial Courts, 4 RUTGERS L. RE . 381 (1950).

4. Peoples City Bank v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 353 Pa. 123, 44 A.2d 514,
518 (1945).
5. 44 F. Supp. 460, 462 (E.D. Mich. 1942).
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trial, to save expense of bringing the witness from a long distance if the
witness was not in the state at the time.0 In a pre-trial hearing in the Northern District of Ohio, the court "limited to one witness on each side on each
major classification of the property involved in the valuation." 7 Judge Kenison
of New Hampshire once suggested that, in preparing for a jury trial, a complicated account, which could be understood by the jury only with great
difficulty, might be simplified in pre-trial.s
Any appraisal of the effect of conference procedure on the rules of evidence
should be made, having in mind the fact that a very substantial portion of
jury cases in the courts in metropolitan centers are disposed of for sums too
small to warrant most lawyers in trying them. In the disposition of such cases
the use of rules of evidence, as contrasted with frank discussion of the case
with a judge in an informal conference, has little value or significance.
The unfortunate effect on laymen, litigants, witnesses and jurymen of the
atmosphere which often prevails in a court room during a trial, can hardly be
exaggerated. The impressions gained there are responsible for much of the
criticism of our courts; and these impressions are based largely on the use and
abuse of the rules of evidence. Not infrequently, feelings closely akin to disgust are aroused in the minds of observers when they see obviously earnest,
honest and sincere witnesses prevented by objections and motions based on
rules of evidence from telling their story and from making what they believe,
and most laymen would consider, to be an honest, helpful contribution to
the solution of the issues involved.
The contrast between the atmosphere of such a court when evidence is
being presented under the rules of evidence and that which prevails in perhaps
an adjoining one where pre-trial hearings are held, or in a judge's chambers
in the same building during a pre-trial conference, is striking indeed. The
one is formal, sometimes merciless, governed by rigid standards, with little
or no attention to human values which may be involved; the other is intensely
human and normal, the approach to the problem involved is realistic, the
discussion is not governed by formal rules or interrupted by technical objections, but usually is characterized by friendly courtesy on the part of all
concerned.
Judge A. David Benjamin of the County Court of Kings County, New
York, in the May 19, 1949 issue of the Bar Bulletin of the New York County
Lawyers Association, tells this story:
6. Penn v. Automobile Ins. Co., 27 F. Supp. 337 (D. Ore. 1939).

7. United States v. Libby-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 14 F.R. Serv. 16.26, Case 1 (N.D.
Ohio 1950). See also International Carrier-Call and Television Corp. v. Radio Corp. of
America, 55 U.S. P.Q. 447, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
8. Murphy & Sons v. Peters, 95 N.H. 275, 62 A.2d 718, 720 (1948). See also
Olearchick v. American Steel Foundries, 73 F. Supp. 273, 280 (W.D. Pa. 1947).
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"Recently, I had before me litigation involving a landlord and a tenant. It was
bitter litigation. It was a three-family house, owned by an old widow. The tenant was
a woman whose husband was a wounded veteran of World War I, now an inmate of a
mental institution; and she was bitter, she was hard; she had become a shrew. She spat
venom. There had been altercations between her and her landlady, who owned this
three-family house which represented the life savings of a poor family. They got into
an argument, and the landlady hit the tenant on her hand with a broomstick and broke
her finger. Probably she was provoked, for the source of provocation was there. I
felt, as I heard the evidence, that maybe I too might have been tempted to strike. But
what could be gained in that case by the continuance of litigation?
"Le'kal principles say that if you use undue force to repel a threatened attack you
are guilty of assault. Students will find that in the book. I didn't look in the books
for the solution of the case. There was this poor old lady sobbing her heart out. In
the front row was this landlady, who, if the judgment went against her for the broken
finger, might lose the home, which she had worked for all her life. And the jury might
so find. Yet, here was this poor lady whose finger had been broken. She had had
medical expenses; she too was entitled to some compensation.
"How can lawyers resolve situations like that by trial? How can juries solve
those torn human emotions which bring about such litigation? I brought them into
my chambers. I felt that a little peace in the life and in the hearts of these people
might be more valuable than merely dollars. Far more important, that they could
live in harmony with each other and find common ground of mutual understanding.
We settled the case for a couple of hundred dollars which paid the medical expenses,
but more than that, they went out with their arms around each other, friends again,
two human beings that were at last at peace with life."
If these litigants could have talked with this judge soon after the case was
at issue, how much bitterness and expense in time and money might have
been saved!

To the solution of this problem, the rules of evidence could

contribute very little.
Why should a judge advocate and urge settlement of a civil case, or
even discuss it with counsel before a trial is begun?
using the rules of evidence a better way?

Is not a formal trial

When a plaintiff submits his cause to a court of law, he seeks a decision by
the court-nothing more. He may insist that the decision be reached only
after a formal presentation of his side under the rules of evidence. That is
his right. His adversary has a similar right; but in the end, the decision
rests with the court, with or without the aid of a jury.
As a first step in reaching that decision, the court has the right to require
discussion with the parties of how and when such presentation shall be made
and to be informed preliminarily of what the case involves and what the
issues are; and once that is done, public policy becomes a part of the problem.
That policy dictates that litigation should be discouraged and minimized;
that quarrels and disputes should be ended just as speedily as possible; that
the facilities of the tax supported courts should be not wasted or abused or
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used to satisfy enmity and hatred. Why in this preliminary discussion, particularly in cases which obviously involve comparatively small amounts, a judge
should not urge the parties to state the facts involved informally to him and
with his assistance, trained as he is, in the decision of disputes, to settle
upon an amount, if any, to be paid, or an adjustment to be reached, it is difficult for the average citizen to see. To him such a method of decision seems
common sense.
Professor Edmund M. Morgan recently discussed the future of the law
of evidence.0 He spoke of the increasing growth of informality and less rigid
adherence to the laws of evidence, and of the battle features of the lawsuit
and then said: "The first device for eliminating the sporting features of a
lawsuit is the pre-trial conference."' 10 He then reviewed the history of pretrial and the use of Federal Rule 16, (the pre-trial rule) and added:
"The judge is able to eliminate the necessity of trial upon issues as to which there
is no bona fide dispute. Of course, if the party and his counsel insist upon refusing to
admit the truth of an allegation merely because they believe the proponent cannot produce admissible evidence, the judge is in no position to compel compliance with his
suggestion. But there is a marked reluctance of reputable counsel to insist upon the

technical requirements when the conference is conducted by an able and tactful judge.""
Courts have an inherent power to adopt any measures which will aid them
in the proper disposition of their work.12 It is therefore within the power of
the court to call counsel in pending cases into conference and to require discussion of the rules which are to be applied during the trial as to evidence
which counsel propose to offer.'5 This may mean stipulation of the issues to
be tried, agreement as to facts regarding which there is no dispute and
simplification as far as possible of the evidence each party proposes to offer.
Where, for instance, the issues involve the publication in different newspapers of advertisements or pictures, under the rules of evidence either party
may demand authentication of each issue by the testimony of someone connected with the newspaper that published it. Today, in such cases, counsel
for both parties can and often do examine and digest evidence of this sort before
the trial under supervision of the court and stipulate the authenticity of much
of it. Counsel who fail to do this and to simplify evidence before offering it,
are not likely to receive much sympathy or consideration from an appellate
court when the record is presented.
9. Morgan, The Future of the Law of Evidence, 29 TExAs L. Rzv. 587 (1951).
10. Id. at 607.
11. Ibid.
12. Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 40 Sup. Ct. 543, 64 L. Ed. 919 (1919).
13. See Venn-Severin Machine Co. v. John Kiss Sons, 2 F.R.D. 4, 5 (D.N.J. 1941);

also Carlock v. Southeastern Greyhound Lines, 8 F.R. Serv. 16.261, Case 1 (E.D. Tenn.
1944) ; United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 63 F. Supp. 175 (S.D. Cal. 1945).
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Arrangements of this sort can be and should be handled through conferences
before the trial and the sooner after issue is joined the better. Judge Arthur F.
Lederle of the United States District Court in Detroit does not delay his conferences until the eve of trial as is the practice in most courts. In his court,
notice of pre-trial hearings go out as soon as a case is at issue. The hearings
are usually held about ten days later. He is obtaining remarkable results. Of
his methods, Judge Lederle states:
"After the pleadings are in proper form, it then becomes necessary to consider
the means by which the necessary allegations are to be proven. In non-jury cases
I normally ask the attorneys to prepare proposed findings of fact in advance of the trial,
After considering the proposed findings about which there is no genuine issue of fact,
it is possible to arrive at rather definite ideas as to the proof necessary to establish the
respective claims as to the existence of the facts that have been proposed. In complicated jury cases I have found it helpful to ask the attorneys to prepare special questions
during the course of the pre-trial hearings on the assumption that I may later decide
that it is advisable to submit the case to the jury for a special verdict or a general
verdict accompanied by answer to the interrogatories. If it is ultimately determined
that a general verdict will be sufficient, the time spent in preparing the special questions
is not wasted for the reason that the study necessitated for the preparation of special
questions helps to clarify the issues for the attorneys and the judge. In such complicated
jury cases I also ask the attorneys to prepare their requested instructions in advance
of the trial. If these matters are taken care of during the pre-trial hearings, the judge
is prepared to rule properly on objections to the evidence with reference to its relevancy.
Conceding that the matter of relevancy is primarily a question of logic, it is nevertheless
important to remember that judicial logic is not always the same as theoretical logic,
and the courts are bound by precedents in this field as in other fields. ' ..

In United States v. Parker-Rust-ProofCo.,'6 at pre-trial hearings in Judge
Lederle's court, stipulations of 98 pages were used identifying documents, the
authenticity of which was not disputed. 16
One of the principal reasons for the comparatively slow spread of the use of
conferences procedure is found in misunderstanding on the part of lawyers
and judges of its true character and its possibilities of usefulness. Not long
ago the writer heard a distinguished lawyer condemn the use of pre-trial conferences in rather unmeasured terms because (so he said) they are used to

force settlements. Yet he had never attended a pre-trial hearing in the courts
which he criticised for using the procedure. There may be an occasional judge
who is over-impressed with the advisability of ending civil disputes without
trying them and who may make it difficult for lawyers who refuse in pre-trial,
to accept the terms of settlement which he suggests. But these instances reflect
not on the conference system but on the judges who use such methods.
14. Letter to writer, January, 1952.
15. 61 F. Supp. 805 (E.D. Mich. 1945).
16. See also United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 63 F. Supp. 175, 1.87 (S.D.
Cal. 1945); Volk v. Paramount Pictures, 86 U.S.P.Q. 201 (D. Minn. 1950).
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The public generally and litigants who seek the aid of the courts to obtain
a quick disposition of their controversies are becoming acquainted with the
conference system and many find difficulty in seeing why their cases cannot be
disposed of in the quiet of a conference between counsel and a judge of the
court without the use of rules of evidence and the formal methods of a trial; and
why also if their opponent seeks to use the facilities of the court for delay,
expense and embarrassment, he should not be compelled to attend such conference and also to stop such tactics and to cooperate in reasonable measures to
save time and expense.
If those who are critical of conference procedure could attend the county
court or the superior court in New Jersey on one of the days devoted to pretrial hearings, they would be impressed with the dignity of the proceeding,
the cooperation of the bar and the lack of effort on the part of the judges to
bring about settlement except with the cooperation of counsel. In these hearings,
the rules of evidence are not forgotten or disregarded. They are used only
when necessary to elicit the true facts. Their use for other purposes is not
permitted.
If these same persons were to attend hearings in open court in King's County
in New York, the Supreme Court in which jury tort cases are called with the
object of settling them or sending them to a lower court if the amount involved
is small, they would appreciate the common sense of the process, for most of
the cases called, if tried, would be disposed of for sums too small to justify the
u.se of the complicated machinery of a jury court, a fact which is realized by
both court and counsel. The judges of these courts settle from 30 to 50% of
such cases in these hearings.1 7
There are two sides to a lawsuit. Usually one side is seeking a quick inexpensive decision of the issues. The other, in most instances, the defendant,
may seek delay and use delay and expensive procedures to wear out his opponent
in the hope of facilitating a favorable settlement. The rules of evidence play
into the latter's hands. Conference procedure can be used to prevent him
from misusing the court's rules and facilities.
The business world has learned to dispose of many claims and disputes
without rules of evidence. In 1950 between $7,000,000 and $7,500,000 of claims
on fire insurance policies were settled without litigation. About 150,000 claims
arose out of the storm of November 25, 1950 in the northeastern states and
practically all of them were settled without resort to the courts.
Perhaps the most serious error of bench and bar in the past many years
has been the attempt to make court procedure an exact science, to force litigants
17. The dissenting opinion of Judge Cardozo in Graf v. Hope Bldg. Corp., 254 N.Y.

1, 7, 171 N.E. 884, 886 (1930), in which Judges Lehman and Kellogg concurred, is of
interest in this connection.
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to conform to rules rather than to use the rules to meet human needs; to put
form above substance; the system above the service it can render. We must
have rules but by this time we ought to use them more wisely and mercifully.
Perhaps pre-trial has a contribution to make to this end.
In most of our civil litigation, the rules of evidence are not used. Particularly is this true in the run-of-the-mine cases in our cities, most of which do
not involve more than $1000. In most courts not over 10% of all civil cases
are even tried or such rules used. Only a very small proportion of commercial
disputes reach the courts, due largely to the feeling in the business world that
there are better ways of reaching a decision of such disputes than by trial under
these rules.
It is now clear that by use of conferences between the court and counsel,
the parties to such disputes can have the aid of trained judges in disposing of
their cases without the use of these rules; and incidentally as taxpayers they
are entitled to such court facilities if they so desire, and the courts should
furnish them. The courts were made for man, not man for the courts.
If it were possible by use of conference procedure to dispose of most of
the smaller cases without trial, the courts would have time to try the cases
that must be tried without haste or pressure using these rules where they are
needed to elicit the necessary facts.
Judge Paul W. Alexander of the Domestic Relations Court in Toledo, Ohio,
recently wrote in The New York Times Supplement of a plan for handling
divorce problems which is sponsored by the American Bar Association.' 8 He
speaks of it as "a healing process." He says that many husbands and wives
who seek divorce are heartsick over their failure to agree and adds that: "In
this upset state they turn to the law for help. But the ponderous, judgmental,
heavy-handed law gives them not help-but hell.... As if they had not had
enough bickering, and battling, the law intensifies their antagonism ...
We lawyers call this 'adversary litigation.' "19
Much of the "hell" in litigation can be caused by the rules of evidence, for
under the adversary system, they can be used by a vindictive opponent to create
expense, delay, bitterness, hardship and disrespect for the courts-for the
law itself.
Is it too much to hope that our judges may fi'nd satisfaction in the use
of their power and influence to make much of our civil litigation "a healing
process" ?
18. Alexander, Divorce W~ithout "Guilt" or "Sb," N.Y. Times Mag., July 1, 1951, p. 14.
19. Id. at 14.

